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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-OFFICER'S VESTED RIGHTS--RIGHT IN NOMINA-
TION To PUBLIc OFFICE AS VESTED PROPERTY RIGHT-[Texas].-Relator as
candidate in a primary election received a majority of the votes cast and
obtained a certificate of nomination. Upon contest the certificate was va-
cated. Relator brought mandamus to compel the county clerk to print his
name on the general election ballot. The court, reasoning that the right to
the nomination was a vested property right, granted the writ because of
improper service in the contest proceeding.'
The general American doctrine is that a public office is not property,
2
and that an officeholder has no vested property right therein.3 A right is
"vested" when there is an ascertained person with a present right to its
present or future enjoyment.4 The phrase "vested rights" is used to desig-
nate interests proper for the state to recognize and protect, and of which
the individual cannot be deprived arbitrarily without injustice.5 There is
no express prohibition of the divestment of vested rights in state or federal
constitutions; 6 but since such divestment will generally infringe constitu-
tional guaranties of due process, the broad proposition has often been laid
down that a legislature cannot impair or destroy vested property rights.7
1. Iles v. Walker (Tex. 1938) 120 S. W. (2d) 418.
2. Mial v. Ellington (1903) 134 N. C. 131, 46 S. E. 961, 65 L. R. A. 697.
A public office has been described as a duty, charge, or trust. Indianapolis
Brewing Co. v. Claypool (1897) 149 Ind. 193, 199, 48 N. E. 228; State Prison
of North Carolina v. Day (1899) 124 N. C. 362, 368, 32 S. E. 748, 46
L. R. A. 295. It has been said to be "a public position, to which a portion
of the sovereignty of a country, either legislative, executive, or judicial,
attaches for the time being, and which is exercised for the benefit of the
public." State v. Spaulding (1897) 102 Ia. 639, 643, 72 N. W. 288; State
ex rel. Attorney General v. Jennings (1898) 57 Ohio St. 415, 425, 49 N. E.
404, 63 Am. St. Rep. 723.
3. White v. State ex rel. Denson (1899) 123 Ala. 557, 26 So. 343; City
of Pasedana v. Charleville (1932) 215 Cal. 384, 10 P. (2d) 745; Sarls v.
State (1929) 201 Ind. 88, 166 N. E. 270, 67 A. L. R. 718; Hoke v. Richie
(1896) 100 Ky. 66, 37 S. W. 83, 38 S. W. 132, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 523; Attorney
General ex rel. Rich v. Joachim (1894) 99 Mich. 358, 58 N. W. 611, 41
Am. St. Rep. 606, 23 L. R. A. 699, holding that since the right to hold
office is not a vested right, the legislature may within limits of the consti-
tution provide methods by which incumbents of office may be removed
before the expiration of their terms; Johnston v. Reeves and Co. (1916)
112 Miss. 227, 72 So. 925; State ex rel. Russell v. Gardner (1924) 218 Mo.
App. 217, 265 S. W. 996; Commonwealth v. Tice (1925) 282 Pa. 595, 128
Atl. 506; State v. Rhame (1912) 92 S. C. 455, 15 S. E. 881, Ann. Cas.
1914B 519; Booten v. Pinson (1915) 77 W. Va. 412, 89 S. E. 985, L. R. A.
1917A 1244; State v. Dahl (1909) 140 Wis. 301, 122 N. W. 748.
4. See Pearsall v. Great Northern R. R. (1896) 161 U. S. 646.
5. Campbell v. Holt (1885) 115 U. S. 620; Fee v. Cowdry (1885) 45
Ark. 410, 55 Am. Rep. 560.
6. Campbell v. Holt (1885) 115 U. S. 620; Baltimore & Susquehanna
R. R. v. Nesbit (1850) 10 How. 395.
7. Windsor v. Des Moines (1900) 110 Ia. 175, 81 N. W. 476, 80 Am. St.
Rep. 280; Sears v. Chicago (1910) 247 Ill. 204, 93 N. E. 158, 139 Am. St.
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The unqualified designation by the court in the instant case of the right
in the nomination to a public office as a vested property right would seem
to imply that relator had such an interest therein that the legislature could
not nullify the nomination by abolishing the office prior to thd completion
of relator's expected term of service. The theory of the American cases,
however, has been that, unless otherwise provided by the constitution, the
power to create an office is vested in the legislative department of the
government;8 and in the absence of a contrary provision of the constitution,
the authority possessing the power to create an office has the implied power
to abolish that office. 9
Some decisions, though expressly rejecting the claim that the right to a
public office is a vested property right, hold that such an office is property
within the guaranties of due process to the extent that the holder of an
office for a definite term may not be deprived thereof without a hearing.10
The doctrine behind these cases, that the right to a public office is an in-
corporeal hereditament, was expressly repudiated by Conner v. New York.11
Where the legislature has provided a remedy by statute for one wrongfully
deprived of such office, the right of such claimant is of course a substantial
right recognized by law.12 This proposition in no way decreases the sov-
ereign power of the state over its offices, a power subject only to the will
of the people as expressed by the constitution.13
In the light of the foregoing review of the decisions it would seem that
the court in the instant case was unfortunate in its selection of the phrase
"vested property right" as descriptive of the relator's interest. The lan-
guage of the court is opposed to settled authority.1 4 If a public office is not
Rep. 319, 20 Ann. Cas. 539; National Bank of Commerce v. Jones (1907)
18 Okla: 555, 91 Pac. 191, 11 Ann. Cas. 1041, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 310.
8. Mial v. Ellington (1903) 134 N. C. 131, 46 S. E. 961, 65 L. R. A.
697, overruling Hoke v. Henderson (1833) 15 N. C. 1, 25 Am. Dec. 677;
United States v. Maurice (1823) 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,747. The power to
create an office may be delegated by the legislature where not prohibited
by the constitution. State v. Spaulding (1897) 102 Ia. 639, 72 N. W. 288.
9. Ford v. State Harbor Commissioners (1899) 81 Cal. 19, 22 Pac. 278;
and see Taylor v. Beckham (1900) 178 U. S. 548, holding that since one has
no vested right to a public office, an appeal from the decisions of state
courts as to the election of an officer could not be made to federal courts
on the ground of deprivation of property without due process of law.
10. Ekern v. McGovern (1913) 154 Wis. 157, 142 N. W. 595, 46 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 796; Finneran v. Burlington (1915) 189 Vt. 1, 93 Ati. 254; cf.
Wammack v. Holloway (1841) 2 Ala. 31.
11. (1851) 5 N. Y. 285.
12. State v. Sams (Ark. 1906) 98 S. W. 955; Banton v. Wilson (1849)
4 Tex. 400.
13. Hoke v. Richie (1896) 100 Ky. 66, 37 S. W. 83, 18 Ky. L. Rep. 523,
38 S. W. 132; Attorney General ex rel. Rich v. Joachim (1894) 99 Mich.
358, 58 N. W. 611, 41 Am. St. Rep. 606, 23 L. R. A. 699.
14. As to incumbents, see cases cited supra, note 3; as to prospective
holders, see Lahart v. Thompson (1908) 140 Ia. 298, 118 N. W. 398, where
the court said that "the nomination at a primary election gives the person
receiving it no vested interest in the office for which he is named or in any
place upon the official ballot which may not be taken away by the state
acting through its legislature or some inferior body to which the power has
been delegated." •
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property, it is difficult to see how a right thereto may be a vested property
right. It is even more difficult so to characterize a mere right of nomination
to a public office. A. B. H.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-TAXATION-RETROSPECTIvE ABROGATION OF Ex-
EMPTIONS-[United States].-Plaintiff paid under protest an income tax
imposed under a Wisconsin act of 1935 upon corporate dividends earned by
plaintiff in 1933 from corporations whose principal business was "attribu-
table to Wisconsin." This class of income had been exempt from such tax-
ation under the Wisconsin Act of 1933.1 In a suit to recover back the sum
paid as illegally assessed, held, that the Wisconsin Act of 1935 did not in-
fringe the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 2
The theory that retrospective tax laws necessarily violate the Federal
Constitution has been definitely exploded.5 Numerous valid retrospective
revisions of the federal and state revenue laws have imposed taxes on sub-
jects previously untaxed or have shifted the burden of old taxes by changes
in rates, exemptions, and deductions. The permissive basis for such legis-
lative action is the fact that taxation is neither a penalty imposed on the
taxpayer nor a liability which he assumes by contract. It is but a way of
apportioning the cost of government among those who in some measure are
privileged to enjoy its benefits and must bear its burdens. No citizen enjoys
immunity from that burden.4
In each particular case, however, it is necessary to consider the nature
of the tax and the circumstances under which it is presented before it can
be said whether the tax levied exceeds the limits of permissible retroactiv-
ity.5 The testse applied in determining the validity of a particular retro-
1. "If 50% or more of the total net income of the corporation paying
them was included in the computation of the Wisconsin tax on corporate
income," such corporate dividends were exempt from any income tax under
the Act of 1933.
2. Welch v. Henry (1938) 59 S. Ct. 121, Roberts, Butler, and McReynolds,
JJ., dissenting.
3. This theory was advanced in Lowenhaupt, The Power of Congress to
Impose Excise Taxes Retroactively (1936) 21 ST. Louis LAW REvmw 109,
where it is said at p. 119: "No one contradicts that a law is tyrannical
which imposes a penalty upon an act which, when the act was done, one
was at liberty to do without any liability." The authorities cited infra,
notes 4-10, and the instant case leave no doubt as to the unsoundness of
this position.
4. Welch v. Henry (1938) 59 S. Ct. 121, 125; Nichols v. Coolidge (1927)
274 U. S. 531; Untermeyer v. Anderson (1928) 276 U. S. 440; Phillip
Wagner, Inc. v. Leser (1915) 239 U. S. 207; Seattle v. Kelleher (1904)
195 U. S. 351.
5. For an excellent presentation of this problem, see Neuhoff, Retrospec-
tive Tax Laws (1935) 21 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW 1, containing a factual
presentation of the leading cases on this subject.
6. Neuhoff, supra, note 5, at 11, noting that a few cases seem not to
conform to these tests and suggesting that this may be due to the fact that
these tests as applied in a particular case "leave considerable room for inter-
pretation" to the judges.
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